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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Americans trust doctors less than they ever have before.1 This 
distrust has been attributed, in large part, to the time constraints that 
doctors face. The average appointment time lasts fifteen minutes.2 
Doctors and patients struggle to make meaningful and authentic 
connections in those allotted fifteen minutes. This time scarcity has 
reverberating effects. A 2001 study by researchers from the University 
of South Carolina found that their physicians typically interrupt patients 
within about twelve seconds of speaking.3 At the same time, costs of 
medical care have risen. For example, colonoscopies, necessary 
screening tests that most Americans have to identify certain types of 
cancer4, cost somewhere between $6,000 and $19,0005 in the United 
States; the same procedure in most other developed countries costs 
$1,000.6 Americans pay, on average, four times as much for a hip 
replacement than do patients in Switzerland or France, and more than 
three times as much for Caesarean sections.7 Hospital stays of duration 
                                                          
1 Just 34% of 2012 Americans said they had “great confidence” in the “leaders 
of the medical profession,” down from 76% in 1966. See Anne Harding, 
Americans' Trust in Doctors is Falling, LIVESCIENCE (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/43EU-WKHV. A survey of people in twenty-nine countries 
revealed that the United States ranks twenty-fourth in public trust of doctors. Id.; 
see also Donna R. Rhoades, et al., Speaking & Interruptions During Primary 
Care Office Visits, 33 FAM. MED. J. 528, 528 (2001)(highlighting the importance 
of communication in the practice of good medicine); see also Dignity Health, 
Here’s Why We Struggle to Make Connections With Our Physicians—and Why 
it Matters, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/854T-QCQ2. 
2 Dignity Health, supra note 1. 
3 Ease of conversation is related to the development of meaningful and authentic 
connections, especially when a patient is communicating symptoms to her 
doctor, but even if small talk is being exchanged. See Donna R. Rhoades, et al., 
supra note 1, at 528-29. 
4 Using the colonoscopy as a comparative tool allows one to effectively control 
for conditions that may be particularly common among a specifically American 
demographic, namely obesity, and procedures that might thusly be more 
expensive because of their “higher” demand. It is clear, then, that American’s 
healthy lifestyle, or lack or thereof, cannot be the reason for the difference in 
cost. 
5 Elisabeth Rosenthal, The 2.7 Trillion Dollar Medical Bill: Colonoscopies 
Explain Why U.S. Leads World in Health Expenditures, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 
2013), https://perma.cc/FQ9S-JJ22. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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cost around three times more in the United States than in other 
developed countries.8 
This elevated cost is borne by the consumer (or patient) of 
these medical goods (treatment), while a consumer’s ability to 
anticipate the costs of those goods is non-existent.9 The consequence of 
this structural alignment against the consumer is particularly 
devastating when the consumer’s choice is limited to one of two 
options: (1) access the goods, or (2) die. Unsurprisingly, medical debt is 
the primary cause of bankruptcy in the United States.10 
Before the Affordable Care Act (ACA),11 much of the elevated 
and rising cost of access to medical care was attributed to two categories 
of people. The first category was Uninsured persons, who cannot be 
turned away by law and were more likely to be unable to pay. The 
second category was the obese, who were thought to access medical care 
more frequently and drive up demand. While these arguments fail for 
several reasons, it is important to address and then dismiss them as 
causal factors for the high cost of access to medical care. 
The first category of persons were those who are uninsured and 
underinsured; and persons who, partially due to the high cost of medical 
care and insurance, chose to forego preventative care and instead opted 
for emergency care. These people represented a significant 
unreimbursed expense for hospitals, which needed to recoup these 
losses. They accomplished this by raising their bills for both the insured 
and uninsured. They did so to significant heights largely expecting that 
insurance companies would negotiate at least some of that increase back 
down to market value. Given the weaker bargaining position that 
uninsured persons possessed, these people ended up the casualties of that 
broken system. It was precisely this problem that the provision requiring 
individuals to purchase health insurance in the ACA was meant to 
address. By 2015, more than twelve million new people had obtained 
insurance through the ACA.12 The uninsured rate in America sunk from 
                                                          
8 Id. 
9 Costs of medical care are opaque. The cost of the same procedure can vary 
drastically depending on the patient, the type of insurance carrier, and the 
treatment facility. Importantly, costs also vary even amongst those with the same 
insurance based on the amount an insurer actually ends up reimbursing the 
patient. See id. 
10 Dan Managan, Medical Bills are the Biggest Cause of US Bankruptcies: 
Study, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2013 2:29 PM), https://perma.cc/2ZH3-JGBQ. 
11 Colloquially known as Obamacare. 
12 Stephanie Marken, U.S. Insured Rate at 11.6% in Third Quarter, GALLUP 
(Oct. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/K69G-V6L6. 
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17.1% in 2013 to 10.9% in the final quarter of 2016.13 
The second category was obese persons, who were thought to 
access care at a higher rate than non-obese persons, thus driving up 
demand. Because they require more medical care in an insurance-based 
system, they were thought to drive up the price of insurance premiums 
paid by healthier and wealthier individuals, especially in a federally 
subsidized system. This argument fails to explain elevated price levels 
in the system as it existed prior to the ACA because obese persons 
could be price-discriminated against or left out of the insurance-based 
system as a whole due to pre-existing conditions. Because insurance 
companies were able to discriminate against obese people on those 
grounds at that time, the obese persons as individuals, likely had to face 
those higher costs themselves; i.e., the cost therefore wasn’t necessarily 
passed on to others attempting to access healthcare. Additionally, it is of 
particular importance to note that Britons live longer and healthier lives 
than Americans despite living similar lifestyles.14 To be clear, 
Americans and Britons make similar lifestyle choices (e.g., exercise at 
similar frequencies, eat similar portion sizes) and have similar rates of 
obesity, yet Britons live longer and have fewer obesity-related health 
issues.15 This evidence suggests that obesity is less likely to be a factor 
in our elevated costs of healthcare because even despite the 
significantly decreased uninsured population, Americans still pay 
significantly more for access to healthcare than any other country, 
including peer nations such as Great Britain.16  
America spends 17.4% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on 
healthcare,17 significantly more than any other country, including both 
                                                          
13 Stephanie Marken, U.S. Insured Rate at New Low of 10.9% in Third Quarter, 
GALLUP (Oct. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/S37X-MVQG. 
14  Eileen M. Crimmins, et. al, Explaining Divergent Levels in High-Income 
Countries,  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES 1, 11 
(2011), https://perma.cc/JVQ2-HDUG. 
15Compare id. (discussing the U.S. longevity with other high-income countries), 
with Ami Sedghi, How Obese is the U.K.? And How Does it Compare to Other 
Countries?, THE GUARDIAN, May 28, 2014, https://perma.cc/UU24-AS5K. 
16 As of 2015, U.S. annual health spending per capita is $8362.00, while Britons 
spend $3480.00 per capita, annually; for every dollar Americans spend on 
healthcare, Britons spend 41 cents. See World Health Organization, Global 
Health Observatory Data (2015); https://perma.cc/F4JQ-5UXE. 
17 See Aaron Carroll, What Makes the US Health Care System so Expensive?, 
THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/KDB7-CL6G/; see also David A. Squires, Issues in 
International Health Policy: Explaining High Health Care Spending in the 
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industrialized and developed nations. Ability to pay is often one of the 
most important factors in explaining the rate of increase in health 
spending among industrialized countries, indeed, it explains 90% of 
healthcare cost;18 however, even controlling for our ability to pay, 
Americans are still paying substantially more than we should for our 
healthcare.19 One supposed explanation for the higher relative cost is 
that Americans receive higher quality care.20 Unfortunately, it is 
debatable at best that the quality of our healthcare and our healthcare 
outcomes are any better than those of other industrialized nations.21 
What makes this pill more difficult to swallow is that Americans are 
nowhere near a path to healthcare spending stability.22 The ACA was 
pitched, at least in part, as a cost-saving piece of legislation that would 
reduce healthcare costs as the pool of insured persons increased and the 
number of “free-riding” uninsured persons decreased. Unfortunately, 
that cost savings has not materialized; the exchanges set up by the ACA 
have merely slowed the rate of increase.23 While the law has been good 
for some,24 the optimistic view is that even while we are not on a path to 
lowering our cost of access to healthcare, we are also not steadily 
raising it. A more realistic view is that we are slightly worse off than 
before because we have eliminated as a causal factor what was believed 
to be the root of our problem. Because of the ACA, it is clear to scholars 
that the uninsured are not the driving force behind the higher healthcare 
costs. Because we can control for lifestyle choices that tend toward 
obesity, and even control for obesity itself by comparing ourselves to 
Britons, we have a basis for concluding that obesity is also not the 
driving force behind our higher healthcare costs. The nail in the coffin 
is that, in some cases, these costs are continuing to climb. 
 Healthcare costs are driven not only by the availability of 
affordable insurance, but also by the availability of healthcare providers. 
                                                                                                                                  
United States: An International Comparison of Supply, Utilization, Prices, and 
Quality, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 (2012), https://perma.cc/QY86-NEB8. 
18 See Carroll, supra note 17. 
19 Id. 
20 David A. Squires, supra note 17, at 9. 
21 Id. This will be discussed in more detail in Part III. 
22 CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2014 LONG-TERM 
BUDGET OUTLOOK 1, 40 (2014), https://perma.cc/R99R-69U3. 
23 Cynthia Cox et al., Analysis of 2015 Premium Changes in the Affordable Care 
Act’s Health Insurance Marketplaces, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(2015), https://perma.cc/83JG-SPCA. 
24 See generally Margot Sanger-Katz et al., Is the Affordable Care Act 
Working?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/T4SU-6Y4R. 
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There is a documented shortage of healthcare providers in the U.S. 
Between 1985 and 2015, the number of medical schools and the number 
of graduating doctors entering the healthcare field increased only 
marginally and has failed to increase at a rate commensurable with 
population growth. Between 1985 and 2005, the United States 
population increased by 23%.25 Between 2005 and 2015, the United 
States population increased at a rate of 8.6%. U.S. population growth 
added millions of Americans to the nation’s demand for health care 
services and there has been no proportionate increase in supply. This 
increase in demand is reflected elsewhere; the interest in the medical 
profession has increased proportionally to demand for services. 
Applications to medical schools increased by 19% between 1985 and 
2005 and again by 35.6% from 2005 to 2016.26 Data about matriculation 
is unavailable for school years occurring before 2005, but since then, the 
number of matriculating medical students has only increased by 
21.1%.27 
It is fair to characterize this behavior as a market abnormality. 
Usually when demand increases so does supply. When markets defy 
expectations, often one of two things is happening, either: (1) the 
underlying assumptions upon which we are basing our predictions are 
incorrect or (2) there is some malfeasance occurring. This paper 
investigates both by examining whether the American Medical 
Association and medical schools are engaging in anti-competitive, 
perhaps even anti-social, conduct that has resulted in perennially high 
and increasing healthcare costs without a proportionate increase in 
healthcare quality and healthcare outcomes. This paper primarily 
examines the latter: the role that anti-competitive behavior by these 
groups, namely the use of monopolization prohibited by Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, plays in determining American healthcare costs. Thus, Part 
II of this paper analyzes American Antitrust Jurisprudence, while Part III 
will thereafter discuss the application of such law to the American 
Medical Association (AMA), in light of the facts that are publicly 
                                                          
25 Growth rate = P2005 – P1985 / P1985 = (296,139,635 - 240,691,557) / 
240,691,557 (“P” equals population). See The World Bank, United States (1985, 
2005) https://perma.cc/R8NH-ABPY. 
26Association of American Medical Colleges, Applicants & Matriculants Data 
Table A-16 (2017), https://perma.cc/9T5A-GE33 (referencing 2015-2016 data, 
on file with author). 
27 See discussion infra; see also Association of American Medical Colleges, 
Applicants & Matriculants Data Table A-16 (2017), https://perma.cc/9T5A-
GE33 (referencing 2015-2016 data, on file with author). 
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available. Finally, Part IV suggests that after North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners, there is, and should be, an avenue to address what is 
either opaque behavior or wrongdoing that costs Americans, both in terms of 
lower quality of healthcare, and monetarily—to the tune of millions of 
dollars each year. 
 
II. ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits certain anti-competitive 
practices, including monopolization. However, under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, being a monopoly is not in itself illegal; to trigger 
liability, an individual must actively monopolize, attempt to 
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize. 28 Analysis under Section 2 
involves two distinct questions: (1) whether the entity in question has 
monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) whether the acquisition 
of that power is distinguishable from growth or development that results 
from superior business acumen, the consequence of a superior product, 
or a historical accident.29  Thus, analysis under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act must be twofold. 
The first inquiry centers on the question of economic substitutes: 
if the entity suspected of monopolization were to raise its prices, would 
consumers turn to an alternative seller or alternative product?30 If the 
entity does not have the power to increase price above current levels (for 
example, an increase in price would drive customers to competitors or 
substitutes), we must then ask whether the entity has already raised 
prices above competitive levels.31 This second inquiry focuses on the 
conduct used in acquiring the monopoly power and whether its purpose 
or effect is anti-competitive in nature. In cases where the conduct falls 
into certain proscribed categories presumed to have an anti-competitive 
effect, the analysis ends here.32 For others we ask whether there are any 
                                                          
28 “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
29 Id. 
30 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945). 
Note that it is often the case that we exclude foreign markets from this analysis 
because there are additional barriers to entry into our market that must be 
overcome in order for the foreign product to be considered a viable substitute. 
31 Id.  
32 See e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 350, 323 (1940) 
(“Any combination formed for the purpose or with the effect of raising, 
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pro-competitive, business justifications for the conduct in question. 
 A. Accreditation Shield 
The problem with regulating the AMA’s33 behavior under the 
aforementioned antitrust jurisprudence is twofold. First, generally 
accreditation policies, and the bodies that create them, have historically 
been granted a great deal of deference from the courts. Where schools 
have challenged an accrediting body’s decision, those decisions, made 
pursuant to certain policies developed by the body, have been granted a 
great deal of leniency under the antitrust laws.34 For a variety of reasons, 
all distinguishable from the situation at hand, courts have been reluctant 
to find that the Sherman Act aggressively polices accreditation.35 Most 
importantly, among these distinctions is that this deference is based on a 
rationale that fails in this context. Courts have held that, despite imposing 
significant output restraints, accreditation does not necessarily prevent 
unaccredited institutions from competing.36 This is true in the legal 
context, which was at issue in Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, 
Inc.37 Many states provide alternative avenues for becoming a licensed 
attorney, but this is not so in the medical context.38 
Even assuming arguendo that the logic from these accreditation 
cases is directly applicable here, it remains true that even when a 
particular group of persons is entitled to deference, even when they have 
successfully rebutted the presumption that they are engaged in behavior 
that is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, this does not end the 
inquiry.39 Despite their protected status, leagues, and other joint ventures, 
                                                                                                                                  
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal 
per se.”). 
33 The Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) is a sub-committee 
under the AMA and, as such, the AMA and the LCME will be used 
interchangeably throughout.  
34 See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3rd Cir. 
1997) (holding that accreditation decisions made by the American Bar 
Association are not in violation of the antitrust laws). 
35 Matthew Struhar, How to Dismantle a Virtual Cartel: The Promises and 
Pitfalls of Higher Education Reform in California, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 127, 
137 (2013). 
36 See e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, 107 F.3d at 1030. 
37 Id. 
38 See discussion infra Section III. 
39 See generally Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945). 
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many still violate the antitrust laws.40 An association is well within its 
rights to limit its membership through certain policies or rules. Nothing 
in this paper suggests that the AMA should be prevented from adopting 
new or amended policies that restrict accreditation, those restrictions 
must, however, be reasonable and non-discriminatory.41  
B. State (Parker) Immunity 
Second, notwithstanding a finding that the AMA is liable under 
the aforementioned framework, they may be entitled to state-action 
immunity.42 On the one hand, the Liaison Committee on Medical 
Education (LCME), and by extension, the AMA, possesses a great deal 
of its power because of its monopoly status as the only accreditor of 
medical schools in the United States. On the other hand, it is this 
monopoly status that is granted by the state.43 Each state grants the 
agency this power by choosing to license as doctors only students who 
have graduated from duly accredited medical schools. Obviously, the 
LCME lacks enforcement power, which also resides with the state. 
State actors are given an exemption from liability for engaging 
in activity that might otherwise be a violation of the antitrust laws. This 
immunity applies to the state when it exercises legislative authority by 
                                                          
40 Compare Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
486 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (holding that while the NCAA was engaged in price 
fixing, leagues have protected status and, as such, courts should take a quick 
look to see if the behavior alleged is truly price-fixing before applying the per se 
rule), and Clarrett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139-41 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that notwithstanding the NFL’s status as a league, eligibility rules that 
preclude certain adults from entering the draft are violations of the antitrust 
laws), with United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912) 
(explaining that when a joint venture has control of a resource that is essential to 
enter and/or compete in an industry it has control of an essential facility and 
excluding others from access to the essential facility must be done on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms), and Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 19 (holding 
that “arrangements or combinations designed to stifle competition cannot be 
immunized by adopting a membership device accomplishing that purpose.”). 
41 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 11-12, 19 (arguing that By-Laws passed by 
the Associated Press (AP) that prohibit members from joining the AP are not 
immunized by AP’s joint venture status because they are designed to stifle 
competition).  
42 See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (holding that 
state and municipal authorities are immune from federal antitrust laws for 
actions taken pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy). 
43 discussion infra; see also Appendix. 
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creating legislation that has anticompetitive effects, but also, and most 
importantly, to private actors (such as the LCME) when they act at the 
direction of the state and pursuant to that legislation. The general 
assumption is that, absent clear congressional intent to preempt, the 
Sherman Act should not invalidate state programs. Congress intended 
the Sherman Act to address private, business combinations, not state 
combinations.44 As a result, in order to determine whether a particular 
state statute was intended to be preempted by the Sherman Act, courts 
will engage in a two-step analysis as directed by Rice v. Norman 
Williams Co.45 
 As an initial matter, courts must decide whether the legislation 
at issue actually encourages prohibited activity at all: whether it 
“mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation 
of the antitrust laws in all cases, or . . . places irresistible pressure on a 
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the 
statute.”46
 Once it is decided that the legislation authorizes anti-
competitive activity, courts will consider whether the state statute is 
entitled to immunity.47 Again the court applies a two-part test: “First, 
the challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, the policy must be 
actively supervised by the State itself.”48 However, where “the states are 
sovereign in imposing [the alleged anticompetitive restraints], the clear 
articulation and active supervision requirements . . . are inapplicable.”49 
The Court reasoned that when the acting entity is the sovereign itself, 
there is less need for scrutiny and concerns about the legitimacy of the 
action are reduced.50 Thus, the test to determine whether there is 
sufficient state involvement to render the acting entity as a sovereign is 
                                                          
44 Parker, 317 U.S. at 359-60. 
45 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). 
46 Id.; see also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.8 (1987) (“Our 
decisions reflect the principle that the federal antitrust laws pre-empt state laws 
authorizing or compelling private parties to engage in anticompetitive 
behavior.”). 
47 Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51. 
48 See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97, 105 (1980) (emphasis added). 
49 Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997); 
see also Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., 17 F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(immunity from antitrust liability exists where the injuries for which the plaintiff 
is seeking recovery flow directly from government action). 
50 Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, 107 F.3d at 1036. 
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unnecessary when the state legislature or state supreme court acts 
directly. Closer analysis is only required “when the activity at issue is 
not directly that of the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by 
others pursuant to state authorization . . . .”51 However, in North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,52 the Supreme Court 
held that a state occupational licensing board primarily composed of 
active market participants in the very market the board sought to 
regulate only had immunity when actively supervised by the state. 
Because the dentists controlled the licensing board, the antitrust laws 
applied in full force and effect, particularly in light of the risks licensing 
boards dominated by market participants may pose to the free market.53 
 The LCME and, by extension the AMA, are acting under a 
directive from each of the states that authorize it to accredit medical 
schools. An attack on how the AMA lobbied to get that power is 
immune from antitrust liability.54 However, state involvement is 
irrelevant when those making the decisions are (1) market participants 
and (2) they are making decisions outside of the scope of the clearly 
articulated policy of the state. Finally, a state that is not diligently 
performing its duties as sovereign by actively supervising those making 
the decisions, state immunity is inapplicable. It is the application of this 
exception that is discussed in Part IV. 
III. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 2 
Becoming a doctor in the United States requires a commitment 
of at least twelve years of medical education. Students must first pursue 
a degree from an accredited college or university. To complete that 
degree, students must usually complete courses in biology; physics; 
calculus; human anatomy; general and organic chemistry; biochemistry; 
as well corresponding laboratory courses. Students looking to continue 
on to medical school must maintain a high grade point average, achieve 
a competitive score on the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), 
                                                          
51 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (emphasis added). 
52 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015). 
53 Id. at 1104 (“Because a controlling number of the Board’s decision makers are 
active market participants in the occupation the Board regulates, the Board can 
invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it was subject to active supervision 
by the State, and here, that requirement is not met.”).  
54 Aside from certain exceptional shams, attempts to lobby the government to act 
are not subject to the antitrust laws. See generally Eastern R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
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and successfully complete admissions interviews. After four years of 
medical school, students must complete a one-year internship (most 
students opt to complete an internship longer than the one-year 
minimum), a three-to-four year residency program, and a fellowship. 55 
 Medical schools must have an accredited hospital where they 
can train their students.56 A doctor must, as a requirement for their 
insurance, be Board Certified for their specialty, and must also be 
licensed to practice medicine by the state and take the Hippocratic Oath. 
 Each state controls its own licensure requirements, and while 
the requirements “vary” among the states, every single state requires a 
candidate to have attended a properly accredited medical school.57 
Empowering the states to decide their own licensure requirements 
serves the medical community by providing, at least in theory, for 
experimentation and local governance. States are free to establish their 
own expert bodies to evaluate whether medical schools are producing 
graduates worthy of licensure. This is precisely the procedure that 
states have adopted for law schools.58 However, every state in the 
country has foregone the potential benefits of a state-centric approach 
by abdicating their power to determine accreditation, opting instead to 
defer to the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME). The 
LCME, a committee of doctors inside the American Medical 
Association, is therefore the sole body overseeing the accreditation of 
American medical schools.59 
 A. Market Power 
There would be no medical schools in America without the 
American Medical Association, and there would be no licensure of 
                                                          
55 The accreditation process of these residency programs vary based on the 
specialty. Id. 
56 The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals controls this 
particular accreditation process. Interview with H. Richard Beresford, Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Dec. 2, 2015). 
57 If a student attends a foreign school, that student must meet a separate set of 
requirements, which involve more testing of the doctor-applicant. See Appendix. 
58 But see Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3rd Cir. 
1997). 
59 See generally American Medical Association (AMA), Council Reports (Mar. 
5, 2017, 9:20 PM), https://perma.cc/LV6P-CSU8; see also AMA, Council on 
Medical Education Liaison Committee for Specialty Boards (Mar. 5, 2017, 9:20 
PM), https://perma.cc/2LJR-9569; see also AMA, About the Council on Medical 
Education (Mar. 5, 2017, 9:20 PM), https://perma.cc/ET2Z-PTTD. 
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doctors without the state. Even between these two actors, the AMA 
controls more of the process because the AMA controls the medical 
schools directly. If the LCME issued additional rules, such as 
mandatory payment of a five million dollar accreditation fee, medical 
schools would be forced to pay this fee. There is no alternative in order 
to give your graduating students opportunity for licensure by the state. 
However, it is important to think of medical schools as sellers 
operating in two distinct markets. They are sellers of a medical 
education to potential medical students. They are also sellers of 
doctors to the states for their licensure, who then license the sale to the 
community at large. 
In considering medical schools as in the former market, we must 
first ask how they would behave if they were rational, self-interested 
actors. How many students would they sell to under hypothetical, less 
restrictive circumstances? The reason that we must artificially bifurcate 
our analysis and consider medical schools only sellers in this market at 
first is because, assuming self-interested rationality, the school would not 
be concerned about the selling of doctors to the state,60 and then the 
community at large, because they normally would not stand to profit off 
of that transaction. This means, in theory, that medical schools would 
have very little incentive to want to limit the overall supply of doctors.61 
In theory, the institutional incentives should align such that every 
medical school matriculates at capacity. Medical schools might harbor 
concerns about the marketability of their students if their students 
underperform to the point of threatening their accreditation status, but 
those concerns should be intermittent, as accreditation only occurs once 
every five years.62 Even accreditation is only a concern insofar as it 
makes the medical school a good choice for potential students. Really, a 
                                                          
60 Just as law schools, for better or worse, are not concerned with how their 
students fare in the market for lawyers. 
61 This is relevant insofar as it concerns the possibility that the medical schools 
are also liable under the Sherman Act. Section 1. Agreement liability 
jurisprudence would suggest that one can infer an agreement to fix prices where 
prices are above competitive levels, where there is parallel conduct, and where 
firms act in ways that would be against their self-interest absent an agreement 
(there would be a great deal of risk associated with this conduct if other’s were 
not participating). Especially where one firm acts as a facilitator in achieving 
such an agreement (also known as a “Hub and Spoke” Conspiracy). See, e.g., 
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939); Toys “R” Us, Inc. 
v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2000). 
62 See LCME, Rules of Procedure, AM. MEDICAL ASSOC. 1, 12 (March 2016), 
https://perma.cc/YR4S-FHJM. 
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medical school’s bread and butter is to take pre-med students and turn 
them into doctors for the low price of $300,000. The more students that 
an administration can get to matriculate at their school in any given year, 
the bigger their class size is, the higher the turnover any given medical 
school has from student to doctor and, in turn, the more revenue they can 
raise in any given year. 
Mercifully for the medical schools, the education that they provide 
is not really a resource that operates under the same scarcity schema that 
is the basis of normal supply and demand, as long as they have the seats, 
they can pack more students into a lecture hall and more doctors onto a 
rotation. Obviously, student-to-faculty ratios are important in judging the 
quality of education one might receive in any given institution, so 
matriculating above capacity is not an ideal situation for the student, the 
consumer, nor truly for the school. Understanding how the institutional 
incentives would align without as restrictive of rules, its understood that 
(1) the AMA must control the number of matriculating medical students 
in any given year; (2) the AMA needs to control the students that each 
individual medical school admits; and (3) the AMA must control the rate 
at which students consume medical education. It is precisely this control 
that ensures that students receive a quality education and that quality 
doctors are treating patients in this country. The question then becomes, 
how strict ought those requirements be? 
There are reasons why medical professional licensure ought to be 
more competitive than licensure in other fields. First, doctors exert 
enormous control over the health and well-being of their patients, often 
in life or death situations. Whether it is making a routine diagnosis, 
ordering a brain scan, or cutting open the human body, there are serious 
costs to inadequate competency. Similarly, faith in the competence of 
medical professionals may be more critical than faith in professionals in 
other industries because society benefits from a commitment on the part 
of all of its members to seeking preventive and corrective care diligently 
and promptly. The whole process of accreditation, and later licensure, is 
presumably to ensure that only students of a certain caliber gain access to 
that kind of power and responsibility.63 
 
                                                          
63 Compare this with the lawyers in the legal profession. There have been 
countless articles about how immoral and fraudulent the accreditation process is. 
A simple Google search for “law school scam” produces over one million 
results. See, e.g., Paul Campos, The Law-School Scam, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 
2014), https://perma.cc/7LN4-82TU. 
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B.  How the Free Market Would Address These 
Problems 
Of course, what is described above is a medical school’s ideal 
situation, but the market for students would clearly repress this urge. 
Any freshman economics major can explain the principles of supply and 
demand. Absent any outside interference, the point at which medical 
schools would sell educations to pre-med students would be determined 
by the demand for doctors. Presumably, students care about the quality 
of the university and the quality of the university is tied to the quality of 
education. This metric may also be tied to how competitive it is to go to 
school there. Presumably, too, the market would set a price for doctors, 
which would be sold by the schools, albeit indirectly, by virtue of loans 
being repaid and by virtue of their degrees being in higher demand. 
Society highly values this work. Medical school is expensive. The influx 
of medical students would react to this price point. Unfortunately, this is 
not actually how the market for potential medical students currently 
operates, and that is a huge problem. 
C.  Monopolization Market Manipulation 
The reason that the market does not operate the way it should is 
because the AMA, through the LCME, controls the number of medical 
students that can matriculate in any given year. They do this by 
conditioning accreditation decisions, at least partially, on the number of 
proposed matriculates. If a medical school administration considers 
increasing its class size by fifteen students or 10%, a number meant to 
include transfers (people who have already been admitted into medical 
school), whichever is smaller, they must inform the LCME via 
petitioning for such a change.64  The AMA controls the supply of 
                                                          
64 See Provost Fin. Admin., Strategic Plan for Enrollment Growth 2010-2020, 
UTMB HEALTH 1, 9 (2011), https://perma.cc/DU9G-V5DJ (“Appropriate 
balance between student enrollment and the total resources of the institution, 
including faculty, physical facilities, appropriate numbers and mix of patients, 
and the operating budget. Significant modifications to the educational program, 
or substantial changes in student enrollment, or variations in the resources of 
the institution may distort this balance.”) (quoting Guidelines for Increasing 
Class Size in Medical Schools Accredited by the LCME or the CACMS)). It is 
impossible to know for certain how important this factor is in accreditation 
decisions because the decisions made by the subcommittee on graduate medical 
education are subject to the strictest confidentiality. Here, where the state’s 
ability to oversee and ensure that proper decisions are being made is dependent 
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doctors in this country by instituting a cap on enrollment below capacity 
as a condition of accreditation for any medical school. There are many 
detrimental resultant effects that include an effect on supply of doctors 
in the United States and an increase in the cost of a medical education, 
but a corresponding decrease in the quality of medical care. It is the 
latter cost that makes our artificial bifurcation important once again.65 
Finally, the manipulation causes an increase on the price of healthcare in 
the United States. I address each of these effects in turn. 
i. Effect on Supply: Resulting in Increased 
Market Price for Medical Doctors 
Let us first address the problem of market price for doctors and 
potential students’ reaction to that market price. To analogize, consider 
the oil market. Rudimentary economics tells us that an oversaturation of 
oil in the market would drive costs of oil down. It would drive oil 
companies out of business, and result in decreased access to oil over time. 
On the other hand, an artificial restriction of oil into the market would 
drive prices up. It is so clear that this relationship exists that price-fixing 
in the United States is synonymous with restricting supply.66  The market 
addressed in this paper is more complicated than the oil market because 
doctors are being consumed on two different levels. We must first 
consider the primary market, a doctor’s ability to be gainfully employed 
by a hospital or in private practice. To restrict supply of doctors as such 
would tend to have an impact on the selling price for medical services 
upon the completion of a doctor’s education.67 In 2015, the average 
primary care physician earned $195,000 for patient care, while the 
                                                                                                                                  
on the availability of this information, that information is presumably 
unavailable without the authority to investigate. The inference that this factor is 
important is warranted given the additional form and the small margin of 
increased enrollment before a petition becomes mandatory (under threat of un-
accreditation). 
65 See Campos, supra note 63. Because of this schema, schools now stand to 
profit from behavior that if other schools were not participating in, would be 
risky from a rational, self-interested actor’s point of view. This is by virtue of 
their engagement in the market for medical school educations. It is under this 
theory that the antitrust laws, as well as the AMA may capture their conduct.  
66 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
67 Not measured by completion of the M.D. degree, but rather completion of all 
of the requirements of becoming a doctor including the internship year(s), 
residency training, and fellowships. 
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average specialist earned $284,000.68 Pediatricians were the only type of 
                                                          
68 This number only reflects patient care activities. The sum is supplemented by 
the amount earned for non-patient care activities (an amount between $6,000 
and $29,000, annually).  
The average supplement across physicians is $14,885. Such activities 
include expert witness duties, product sales, speaking engagements, and the 
ordering of patient-care salaries, which all look remarkably similar to this scale. 
See Robert L. Phillips, Jr. et al., Specialty & Geographic Distribution of the 
Physician Workforce: What Influences Medical Student & Resident Choices, 
THE ROBERT GrAHAM CTR. 1, 41 (2009), https://perma.cc/82L9-QBAK.  
There is strong comparative analysis data and information on income 
of medical students and professionals. See Venis Wilder, et al., Income 
Disparities Shape Medical Student Specialty Choice, INST. OF MEDICINE 1, 1 
(2010), https://perma.cc/YQH9-B3X2 (discussing income disparities effecting 
students’ choices of focus area); see also Margaret Edmunds et. al., Geographic 
Adjustment in Medicare Payment—Phase I: Improving Accuracy, INST. OF 
MEDICINE 1,  (2012), https://perma.cc/PK7L-5YJL (highlighting the impact of 
medicare on the medical profession); Ya-Chen Tina Shih & Thomas R. Konrad, 
Factors Associated With the Income Distribution of Full-Time Physicians: A 
Quantile Regression Approach, 42 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 1895, 1906 
(2007), https://perma.cc/VW85-VG4B; see also Kathryn Dill, The Richest and 
Poorest States in 2014, YAHOO FINANCE (Oct. 13, 2014, 12:12 PM), 
https://perma.cc/DV32-B7LX (demonstrating the diverse finance situations of 
the states); see also Tom Florence, Trends in Physician and Advanced 
Practitioner Employment, MERRITT HAWKINS (Jun. 30, 2014, 11:28 AM), 
https://perma.cc/ELT6-L3LQ; see also Leigh Page, 12 Changes that will Affect 
Doctors' Income in 2015, MEDSCAPE BUSINESS OF MEDICINE (Nov. 25, 
2014), https://perma.cc/W6EX-TCZM (discussing forthcoming changes in 
medical professional’s income); see also BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE PHYSICIANS 
WORKFORCE: PROJECTIONS AND RESEARCH INTO CURRENT ISSUES 
AFFECTING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 23 (2008), https://perma.cc/M358-PYZF; 
see also Karen Sibert, Don't Quit This Day Job, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 
11, 2011), https://perma.cc/82LP-BX3Z (discussing the number doctors and 
how it impacts the ability for professionals to get fulltime and full paying jobs); 
see also Susan Pollart et al., Characteristics, Satisfaction, and Engagement of 
Part- Time Faculty at U.S. Medical Schools, 90 ACAD. MED. 355, 360 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/72SF-9K7W; see also Sheri Porter, What's All the Buzz About 
Direct Primary Care?, AAFP NEWS (May 6, 2014, 8:45 PM), 
https://perma.cc/JC26-FJSM; see also Megan Brooks, Less Money, More Rules 
for US Physicians in 2015, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWS (Jan. 2, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/8STR-NG7A; see also Douglas Staigeret al., Trends in the 
Work Hours of Physicians in the United States, 303 JAMA 747, 752 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/5YP3-UPMX; see also Peter Ubel et al., Full Disclosure-Out-
of-Pocket Costs as Side Effects, 369 N. ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1484, 
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doctors to earn less than the $195,000 number, the average one taking 
home $189,000.69 The top earners were orthopedic specialists, who 
earned an average yearly salary of $421,000. The amount that doctors are 
paid obviously factors into the cost of a medical education in this country 
as well as how highly people value doctors. Perhaps most notably, there 
is a variation in amounts paid to medical doctors, even controlling the 
medical field in which a doctor might practice. 
 To continue our comparison to the market for new lawyers, this 
lack of uniform pricing suggests that medical doctors, even controlling 
for field of medicine, have increased bargaining power relative to their 
legal counterparts. This difference is significant as it prompts the 
question: Why? The lack of bargaining power for new associates is 
often attributed to the oversaturation of new lawyers each year, and not 
due to collusion on behalf of the large firms. Lack of uniform pricing, 
even over time, suggests that the market is not leveling out the way one 
would expect it to. An explanation for this is an artificially increased 
bargaining power for medical doctors upon their completion of their 
requirements. Further evidence of this increased bargaining power 
includes some hospitals’ willingness to take over the student loan 
obligations of a newly employed physician.70  This perk can be valued at 
an average $61,000 yearly over the repayment period.71 
ii. Effect on Consumer: Increased Costs of 
Healthcare 
Limiting the ability of medical schools to take on as many students as 
their capacity allows the AMA, through the LCME, to engage in 
monopsony and monopoly behavior. They alone control access to 
medical educations through the accreditation process. The AMA, 
through the LCME’s regulation of medical schools, engages in this anti-
competitive behavior by controlling the output of doctors. 
They artificially suppress the supply of doctors through their 
                                                                                                                                  
https://perma.cc/553J-RWUR. 
69 Phillips, Jr., et al., supra note 68, at 21-22. 
70 The terms of these agreements often pay the debt off completely within three 
years. 
71 According to the most recent, publicly available data, the average medical 
student’s debt obligation is $176,000, and the median debt obligation is 180,000. 
See generally Medical Education Debt Fact Card, AAMC (Oct. 2014), 
https://perma.cc/7J4F-W3AF. 
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accreditation policies. By refusing to accredit necessary medical 
schools and capping medical school attendance below capacity, they 
arbitrarily exclude from the profession those who are qualified. The 
effect of this arrangement is that employers of doctors must pay more 
than they otherwise would for that doctor’s services and doctors can 
charge more to patients for their services. This is exacerbated at the 
specialist level. Furthermore, this increases the cost of all healthcare, 
not just patient visits. 
iii. Lack of Pro-Competitive Justifications: 
Quality of Care 
Between 1986 and 2005, only one medical school was 
accredited in the United States.72 One medical school closed during that 
time, and two schools merged, resulting in the number of medical 
schools falling from 126 to 124.73 Between October 2005 and 2012, 
that number increased slightly to 141.74 At the same time, the 
population in the United States increased from 240 million in 1986, to 
296 million in 2005, and to 313 million in 2012.75 This, combined with 
the fact that medical schools have had to petition for the right to 
increase their class size as a condition of continuing accreditation,76 
suggests that the supply of doctors is thus not properly responding to 
the increase in demand. This lack of response is profitable to existing 
doctors because it makes them, and their services, more desirable. On 
the other hand, one can see how the market for potential medical 
students does respond to this increased demand, as the number of 
applications to medical schools has increased. Despite this, the ratio of 
applicants to matriculates has decreased, and the number of 
matriculates has remained largely stagnant.77  The effects are twofold: 
(1) it is more profitable to be a medical school, and (2) there is an 
increase in the market price for healthcare. 
                                                          
72 See A Snapshot of the New and Developing Medical Schools in the U.S. and 
Canada, AAMC (Oct. 2012), https://perma.cc/UH8N-8C9K.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See Population Growth, THE WORLD BANK (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/82FJ-GQW8. 
76 See discussion infra; Association of American Medical Colleges, Applicants 
& Matriculants Data Table (2017), https://perma.cc/9T5A-GE33 (referencing 
2015-2016 data, on file with author). 
77 Id. 
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Medical schools are not truly doing their job if someone who 
spends four years learning, takes and passes a national test, does at least 
one year of an internship, completes three to four years of a residency, 
completes a fellowship, and gets board certified on top of all of that, is 
not qualified to provide essential healthcare services to the American 
public. Notwithstanding that fact, the argument advanced for 
restricting the amount of students who can be admitted and who can 
matriculate to medical schools in America is that we must ensure that 
the physicians are duly qualified and that healthcare outcomes are 
positive. 
As explained above, in Part I, the United States healthcare 
system is the most expensive of any industrialized nation and the most 
expensive of any in the world. At the same time, most reports show that 
the United States consistently underperforms relative to other countries 
on most dimensions of performance.78 According to a study from John’s 
Hopkins University, the United States also ranks behind most countries 
on many measures of health outcomes, quality of care, and efficiency.79 
The major findings include: compared with the other countries studied, 
the U.S. has lower scores on safe and coordinated care that tend to pull 
the overall U.S. quality score down.80 On indicators of efficiency, the 
U.S. ranks last. The U.S. also has poor performance on measures of 
administrative costs as well as on measures of administrative hassles.81 
There is more avoidable emergency room use in the United States, as 
well as duplicative medical testing.82 People of a higher degree of illness 
in other countries are less likely to visit the emergency room for a 
condition that could have been treated by a regular doctor, had one been 
available.83 Finally, the U.S. ranks last overall on all three indicators of 
a healthy life: mortality access to medical care, infant mortality, and 
healthy life expectancy at age sixty.84 
IV. DENTAL EXAMINERS: A NEW HOPE 
                                                          
78 See generally Karen Davis, et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, 2014 Update: 
How the U.S. Healthcare System Compares Internationally 2014, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 2014), https://perma.cc/4J4Y-GARN. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
84 Id. 
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The Liaison Committee on Medical Education is made up of 
doctors who stand to profit from a decreased supply of doctors. They 
are active market participants under Dental Examiners. This is evident 
not only from the make up of the panel, but also because of the expertise 
required to make accreditation decisions. The interesting question, 
therefore, is whether the decisions that they are making are immune 
because they fall within the clearly articulated policy from the states. 
There is a range in each of the sovereign’s statement, from “properly 
accredited by an approved accrediting agency” to “accredited by the 
LCME”. Whether this is a clear directive almost certainly depends on 
whether one believes the state’s articulated policy to be one of quality 
control. Is the state saying to the LCME, “We want you to only let in 
very good doctors, even if that means your rules unreasonably restrict 
the supply of doctors in this state?” This would be a clearly articulated 
policy if it were not for the reality that it is lacking from any state’s 
legislative directive. 
 While unreasonably restricting the supply of doctors is probably not 
what the state desires, it is at least an open question whether that is indeed 
what the state is directing the LCME to do. Notwithstanding that 
directive, the sovereign must still actively supervise the entity it directs. 
The state currently fails to supervise the LCME, in fact, it lacks the 
ability to adequately supervise the board. Of course, on some level it 
must be true that the state wants to ensure that only qualified doctors are 
licensed to practice in their state, but what is unclear is whether the 
directive authorizes the current restriction level. Ultimately, the state 
must ask itself this question: is it better to have a shortage of doctors85 or 
is it better to perhaps have lesser qualified doctors but no shortage 
thereof?  Hopefully the state is able to find the sweet spot in between the 
two. It is precisely this reason that active supervision or, in the 
alternative, competition is required. 
 Upon looking at these statutes, reproduced in Appendix I, one 
will find that legislatures often use “an accredited school” as a proxy for 
qualified to train a student to become an adequate doctor. From that 
statement alone, it is not clear whether the states mean “make sure that 
your medical schools are competitive” or rather, “ensure that you only 
train the top undergraduates”. This is thus not a clearly articulated policy 
of the state and would fail our analysis here.  Despite this, one can 
imagine it to mean that the accrediting board should ensure a high quality 
of doctors, it is not clear that this directive implies even if the practices 
                                                          
85 Best estimates put the shortage at 90,000 fewer doctors than we need to 
adequately service the population.  
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unreasonably restricts supply. This option is accompanied by the 
problems our currently failing system faces, chief of which is the inflated 
cost incurred by the consumer (patient).  Dental Examiners makes it clear 
that the presumption is states do not intend to restrict the application of 
the Sherman Act.86 Even more, it is clear from the directive that what is 
of utmost importance is that patients are adequately treated. If one is 
restricting supply, invariably at some point patients are not being treated 
adequately by literal definition. The only reading that could justify the 
status quo is if a state, indeed every state, is directing the LCME to “train 
only what you consider to be the best candidates, whatever the cost to our 
healthcare outcomes and/or the cost to our citizens.”87   
 There are not enough doctors. Because of this shortage, the 
doctors that do practice do not have enough time to adequately assess the 
health condition of their patients. They are not getting enough sleep. They 
can only see a patient for fifteen minutes. They need to undercut their 
relationship with their patients by getting quickly to “the point” and 
interrupting them after twelve seconds of communication. It is not clear 
enough that the statute provides a directive to restrict access to medical 
school even if it means an unduly restricted supply of doctors, but by 
doing so, they might actually be running afoul of the actual articulated 
policy that the board is meant to carry out. Moreover, even if patients 
were not being harmed, preventing competition and creating barriers to 
entry if they are not within the State’s command scope is still wrong and 
runs afoul of the articulated aim of the Sherman Act. The doctors that are 
forced to be educated elsewhere because they did not get into medical 
schools in the United States is enough of a social harm to warrant change. 
The patient harm is salt in the proverbial wound. Even if quality of 
healthcare were constant, this behavior would still be a violation of the 
Sherman Act insofar as it harms would-be competitors to this degree. 
Is the current regime acceptable to the sovereign? De facto, no 
state can possibly actively supervise this. The states do not have an 
apparatus with the requisite expertise; there is no state Surgeon General. 
That is why it is so interesting that each state law is, at its basic level 
whatever the LCME wants. While a clever defense attorney would argue 
every state has chosen to use this one committee and thus the LCME 
gets more supervision than anyone, this argument fails because, while 
                                                          
86 See e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110-12 
(2015). 
87 And even if this conjecture were true, the LCME would still need to be 
actively supervised by every state to ensure compliance with the directive and 
thus grant them immunity. 
22
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol17/iss2/2
  
 
 
Issue 2  Healthcare in America 67 
theoretically the states could issue guidance through their guidance their 
respective Attorneys General, they cannot, because they have never 
applied any variation to any LCME decision. In practice, the states lack 
the requisite expertise to adequately supervise this apparatus. In order to 
do so, the states would be required to have medical professionals 
supervising the regulation for medical schools in their state. If the states 
were actually supervising the schools, might one state disagree on an 
accreditation decision?  Many states have tweaked the American Bar 
Association model rules. Many states have even tweaked the Uniform 
Commercial Code. However, coincidently, all states actively agree with 
every comma in every decision made by the LCME? Every 
accreditation decision made by the American Bar Association is 
published. This stands in stark contrast to the LCME, in which all 
decisions are subject to the strictest of confidentiality. There literally is 
no process. How can there be supervision when the decision-making 
process is so intentionally opaque? 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The cost of healthcare in America is an ongoing concern. 
Efforts to increase access to adequate care will fail unless the cartel that 
governs the decision of how many doctors to produce in America is 
adequately supervised or broken up—subject to competition in that 
market forces their actions to comply with what is in the best interest of 
society and not what will line their own pockets. If Dental Examiners is 
applied literally, it should apply to every licensing board across medical 
specialties. In this case, it is not the licensing board that is acting anti-
competitively, but rather the agency that the licensing board defers to. 
While it could be argued that this additional step provides a shield the 
Sherman Act may not be able to penetrate, it plays no functional role. 
The question is whether it should play a substantive role. It should not. 
VI. APPENDIX: LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS BY STATE 
New York’s Licensure Requirements, in relevant part: 
 
§6528. Qualification of certain applicants for licensure. 
 
1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article or any law to 
the contrary, an individual who at the time of his enrollment in a 
medical school outside the United States is a resident of the 
United States shall be eligible for licensure in this state if he has 
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satisfied the requirements of subdivisions one, five, six, seven 
and eight of section sixty- five hundred twenty-four of this 
chapter and: 
has studied medicine in a medical school located outside the 
United States which is recognized by the World Health 
Organization; has completed all of the formal requirements of the 
foreign medical school except internship and/or social service; 
has attained a score satisfactory to a medical school approved by 
the Liaison Committee on Medical Education on a qualifying 
examination acceptable to the state board for medicine, and has 
satisfactorily completed one academic year of supervised clinical 
training under the direction of such medical school; has 
completed the post-graduate hospital training required by the 
Board of all applicants for licensure; and has passed the 
examination required by the Board of all applicants for licensure. 
2. Satisfaction of the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of 
subdivision (a) of this section shall be in lieu of the completion of 
any foreign internship and/or social service requirements, and no 
such requirements shall be a condition of licensure as a physician 
in this State. 
3. Satisfaction of the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) 
of subdivision (a) of this section shall be in lieu of certification 
by the Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates, 
and such certification shall not be a condition of licensure as a 
physician in this State for candidates who have completed the 
requirements of subdivision (a) of this section. 
4. No hospital licensed by this State, or operated by the State or a 
political subdivision thereof, or which receives state financial 
assistance, directly or indirectly, shall require an individual 
who has satisfied the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and 
(3) of subdivision (a) of this section, and who at the time of his 
enrollment in a medical school outside the United States is a 
resident of the United States, to satisfy any further education 
or examination requirements prior to commencing an 
internship or residency. A document granted by a medical 
school located outside the United States which is recognized 
by the World Health Organization issued after the completion 
of all the formal requirements of such foreign medical school 
except internship and/or social service shall, upon certification 
by the medical school in which such training was received of 
satisfactory completion by the person to whom such document 
was issued of the requirements listed in paragraph (3) of 
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subdivision (a) of this section, be deemed the equivalent of a 
degree of doctor of medicine for purposes of licensure and 
practice as a physician in this State. 
 
California Licensure Requirements, in relevant part: 
 
Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 16, § 1314. Approved Schools. 
 
(a) Those medical schools accredited by the Liaison Committee on 
Medical Education of the Coordinating Council on Medical 
Education or the Council on Medical Education of the 
Canadian Medical Association shall be deemed to be approved 
by the division for the giving of resident professional 
instruction in medicine. 
(b) A current list of such medical schools shall be maintained on file 
in the Sacramento office of the division. 
(c)  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the division 
from disapproving a medical school which does not comply with 
Section 2089 of the code. 
 
Statutory Authority: 
Section 2018, Business and Professions Code. Reference: 
Sections 2005, 2037 and 2084, Business and Professions 
Code. 
 
Florida Licensing Requirements, in relevant part: 
 
Fla. Stat. §458.311. Licensure by examination; requirements; fees. 
 
(1) Any person desiring to be licensed as a physician, who does not 
hold a valid license in any state, shall apply to the department on 
forms furnished by the department. The department shall license 
each applicant who the board certifies: 
(a) Has completed the application form and remitted a 
nonrefundable application fee not to exceed $500. 
   (b)  Is at least 21 years of age.  
   (c) Is of good moral character. 
(d) Has not committed any act or offense in this or 
any other jurisdiction which would constitute 
the basis for disciplining a physician pursuant 
to s. 458.331. 
(e) For any applicant who has graduated from medical 
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school after October 1, 1992, has completed the 
equivalent of 2 academic years of pre-professional, 
postsecondary education, as determined by rule of 
the board, which shall include, at a minimum, 
courses in such fields as anatomy, biology, and 
chemistry prior to entering medical school. 
(f) Meets one of the following medical education and 
postgraduate training requirements: 
1.a. Is a graduate of an allopathic medical school or 
allopathic college recognized and approved by 
an accrediting agency recognized by the United 
States Office of Education88 or is a graduate of 
an allopathic medical school or allopathic 
college within a territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States recognized by the accrediting 
agency of the governmental body of that 
jurisdiction; 
1.b. If the language of instruction of the medical 
school is other than English, has demonstrated 
competency in English through presentation of a 
satisfactory grade on the Test of Spoken English 
of the Educational Testing Service or a similar 
test approved by rule of the board; and  
1.c. Has completed an approved residency of at 
least 1 year. 
 
Texas Licensure Requirements, in relevant part 
 
Tex. Occ. Code § 155.003. General Eligibility Requirements. 
 
(a) To be eligible for a license under this chapter, an applicant must 
present proof satisfactory to the board that the applicant: 
(1) is at least 21 years of age; 
(2)  is of good professional character and has not violated 
Section 164.051, 164.052, or 164.053; 
(3)  has completed: 
(A) at least 60 semester hours of college courses, 
other than courses in medical school, that are 
                                                          
88 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CURRENT LIST OF 
ACCREDITING AGENCIES & THE CRITERIA FOR RECOGNITION BY THE U.S. 
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 15-16 (2008), https://perma.cc/U5GG-62EL. 
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acceptable to The University of Texas at Austin 
for credit on a bachelor of arts degree or a 
bachelor of science degree; 
(B)  the entire primary, secondary, and premedical 
education required in the country of medical 
school graduation, if the medical school is 
located outside the United States or Canada; or 
(C) substantially equivalent courses as determined by 
board rule; 
(4) is a graduate of a medical school located in the United 
States or Canada and approved by the board; 
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